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INTRODUCTION

On February 5, 2011, Aaron Graham and Eric Jordan were arrested in
Baltimore after witness descriptions tied them to the robberies of two fast food
restaurants.I As part of an investigation into area robberies, federal authorities
requested a court order requiring Sprint/Nextel to turn over location data from
the defendants' cell phones.2 The government requested the information "to
more conclusively link the [d]efendants with the prior robberies." 3 Eventually,
the government obtained two orders authorizing the release of a combined 221
days of location data from the defendants' cell phones.4 The evidence obtained
as a result of these orders helped the government secure indictments against the
defendants for multiple robberies in the Baltimore area.5 The district court
upheld the government's method of obtaining the information, notwithstanding
the defendants' claims that it violated their constitutional rights. 6
The federal government's practice of spying on the private communications
of Americans has been at the forefront of the national debate over privacy in the
past year. Anyone with access to a TV, computer, or newspaper is probably
aware of the scandal unleashed by National Security Agency (NSA) leaker

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 385-86 (D. Md. 2012).
Id. at 386.
Id.
See id. at 387.
See id. at 386-87.
Id. at 404.
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Edward Snowden. But while the NSA continues to garner headlines,8 the use of
personal communication data is hardly limited to federal authorities.
Increasingly, state and local police departments are turning to cell site location
information (CSLI) to track users' locations. 9 A nationwide survey of police
practices conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) revealed
just how prevalent the practice is. 10 Over 250 police departments responded to
the ACLU's requests for information on their policies regarding CSLI; all but
thirteen admitted to the use of cellular location data. Some of the departments
responded that they require warrants supported by probable cause before
ordering phone companies to disclose user location data.12 Those departments,
however, appear to be the exception, not the rule.13 For example, the Wilson
County, North Carolina Sheriffs Office obtained nearly a month's worth of
cellular location data because an officer had "reason to believe" the information

7.
See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, Revealed: How US Secretly Collects
PrivateData From AOL, Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Paltalk,Skype, Yahoo and You Tube,
THE GUARDIAN (London), June 7, 2013, at 1, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data (providing an example of the revelation of a controversial NSA
program codenamed "Prism"); Matt Smith, NSA Leaker Comes Forward, Warns of Agency's
'ExistentialThreat,' CNN (June 9, 2013, 9:18 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/09/politics/nsaleak-identity/ (stating that Edward Snowden claimed to leak the controversial and highly publicized
NSA documents).
8.
See, e.g., James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Examines Social Networks of U.S.
Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2013, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/
us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?pagewanted all&_r=0 (describing how the
NSA uses phone numbers, email addresses, and publicly available information to create "social
network diagrams"); Charlie Savage, In Test Project, N.S.A. Tracked Cellphone Locations, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2013, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/us/nsa-experimenttraced-us-cellphone-locations.html?src=recg (discussing a pilot program to collect cell site location
information en masse).
9.
See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Police Are UsingPhone Tracking as Routine Tool, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2012, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/us/police-tracking-ofcellphones-raises-privacy-fears.html (describing the widespread use of CSLI by local police
departments). In fact, the practice has become so widespread that some carriers have created
catalogs detailing the services they can provide, as well as how much those services cost, with the
most invasive services costing up to $2,200. See id.
10. See Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request, ACLU, https://www.
aclu.org/protecting-civil-liberties-digital-age/cell-phone-location-tracking-public-records-request
(last visited Mar. 5, 2014).
11. Id. ACLU affiliates submitted requests to the Greenville County Sheriffs Office, the
Myrtle Beach Police Department, and the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), but
the ACLU has not listed responses to those requests on its website. See Is Your Local Law
Enforcement Tracking Your Cell Phone'sLocation?, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/maps/your-locallaw-enforcement-tracking-your-cell-phones-location (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).
12. See Cell Phone Location Tracking PublicRecords Request, supra note 10; see also, e.g.,
Letter from Jay Hinkel, Deputy City Att'y, City of Wichita, to Doug Bonney, Chief Counsel &
Legal Dir., ACLU Legal Dep't (Aug. 15, 2011), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/
cellphonetracking/20120328/celltrackingpra wichitapd wichitaks.pdf (responding to an ACLU
open records request by stating that the City of Wichita obtains cell phone location records only
pursuant to affidavits supported by probable cause).
13. See Cell Phone Location Tracking PublicRecords Request, supra note 10.
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was "relevant and material" to a criminal investigation.14 Police in Lincoln,
Nebraska, have used a nearly identical standard to obtain not only CSLI, but
Global Positioning System (GPS) data as well.
This raises the following questions: What is CSLI, and why should privacy
advocates be concerned about its acquisition by government agencies? At least
one federal district court made extensive findings of fact as to the nature of CSLI
before refusing to issue an order requiring a cellular company to turn over this
information. 16 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas found
that a cell phone works by using base stations, or "cell sites," to connect the
phone to the telephone network.1
Whenever the phone is turned on, it
periodically registers with the nearest cell site;" this happens automatically,
"without the user's input or control."1 9 A cell phone's location can be
determined by using either GPS satellite technology or cell site information.20
While the use of GPS satellites allows for greater precision in determining a
phone's location, it is not always a viable option, in part because some cell
phones are not equipped with GPS technology.21
CSLI, which is more
commonly utilized, determines a phone's location based on the cell sites with
which it registers when making or receiving calls, or when moving from one site
to another. 2 As cellular network use has increased, the areas served by a
particular cell site the "cell sector" have shrunk dramatically. 23 As a result,
the court concluded that "knowing the base station (or sector ID) handling a call
is tantamount to knowing the user's location to within a relatively small
geographic area.

In urban areas . . . this area can be small enough to identify

individual floors and rooms within buildings." 24 The court found that such
information could be used to "track the user on a minute by minute basis,
compiling a continuous log of his life, awake and asleep." 25

14. See Response to Request Regarding Cell Phone Location Records, at 1773 (Oct. 11,
2011), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/cellphonetracking/20120328/celltrackingpra wilson
countysheriff wilsoncountync.pdf.
15. See Order In the Matter of the Application of the State of Nebraska for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Cellular Records with Subscriber Info. & Precision Location, available
at
https://www.aclu.org/files/cellphonetracking/20120328/celltrackingpra lincolnpd3_lincolnne.
pdf.pdf#page=2.
16. See In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 83135, 846 (S.D. Tex. 2010), vacated,724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).
17. Id. at 831.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 832.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 833.
25. Id. at 835; see also State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. 2013) ("Cell phones register or
identify themselves with nearby cell towers every seven seconds. Cell providers collect data from
those contacts, which allows carriers to locate cell phones on a real-time basis and to reconstruct a
phone's movement from recorded data.").
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While states have increasingly turned to the use of CSLI, they have also led
the way in extending greater privacy protections to this information. This Note
discusses these state actions against the backdrop of current federal case law
with an eye toward developing a policy in South Carolina that effectively
protects individuals' right to privacy. This Note argues that, as South Carolina's
constitution provides privacy protections beyond those secured by the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, courts in South Carolina should require a
warrant supported by probable cause before police can obtain CSLI.
Part II provides background information on the current state of privacy law
in the United States, as determined by the Supreme Court and federal appellate
courts. Part III discusses the actions various states have taken to provide greater
privacy protections than those currently afforded under federal Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Part IV argues that South Carolina should follow the
example of those states providing greater privacy protections to their citizens by
requiring warrants supported by probable cause whenever the police seek CSLI
from a cellular telephone company. Part V concludes by reiterating that South
Carolina's citizens deserve-and their constitution requires the greater privacy
protections discussed throughout this Note.
II.

FEDERAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Supreme Court

The starting point for any discussion of privacy law is Katz v. United
26
States.
In Katz, the Supreme Court removed the "place" requirement from
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, holding that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places."27 Justice Harlan's concurrence established the standard that
has since guided the Court when faced with privacy questions.28 According to
Justice Harlan, the Fourth Amendment protects a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy, which is "an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy ... that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 29 Importantly
for the purposes of this Note, the Court also recognized that "the protection of a

26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979) ("In
determining whether a particular form of government-initiated electronic surveillance is a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, our lodestar is Katz v. United States." (footnote
omitted)).
27. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) ("Our later cases
[interpreting the Fourth Amendment] have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan's concurrence in
[Katz] . . . ." (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring))).
29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
South Carolina has followed the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard. See, e.g., State v. Ferrell, 274 S.C. 401, 408, 266
S.E.2d 869, 872 (1980) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361) (finding an expectation of privacy during a
search incident to arrest to be unreasonable based on Justice Harlan's standard in Katz).
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person's general right to privacy . . is . . . left largely to the law of the

individual States." 30
More than a decade later, in Smith v. Maryland,31 the Court applied the
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis in the context of phone records. 32In
that case, the police instructed the telephone company to install a pen register to
record all of the phone numbers dialed from a robbery suspect's home. 33
Although the police request was not accompanied by a warrant or court order,
police used the information obtained from the pen register to obtain a warrant to
search the suspect's home. 34 The Court expressed "doubt that people in general
entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial.",3 The
Court went on to say that, even if the suspect had a subjective expectation of
privacy in the numbers dialed from his home, the suspect's expectation was not
reasonable because "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties."36 Accordingly, by placing
phone calls, the suspect "voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the
telephone company" and "assumed the risk that the company would reveal to
police the numbers he dialed. "37 The Court based its holding on prior decisions,
particularly United States v. Miller,38 which espoused a so-called third-party
doctrine applicable to business records.39 In Miller, the Court refused to find a
Fourth Amendment violation when federal agents obtained bank records without
a warrant because the "information [was] voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business."40 Therefore, no
constitutional violation occurs when the government acquires "information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to [g]overnment authorities, even
if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed. 41

30. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51 (majority opinion).
31. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
32. See id. at 741-45 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167, 174 75
(1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Hodge v. Mountain Sales Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 266 (9th Cir. 1977)
(Hufstedler, J., concurring); Victor S. Elgort, Note, The Legal Constraintsupon the Use of the Pen
Register as a Law Enforcement Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1028, 1029 (1975)).
33. Id. at 737.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 742.
36. Id. at 743-44.
37. Id. at 744.
38. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
39. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43).
40. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
41. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438 (1963)).
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Smith also produced two well-reasoned dissents.42 Justice Stewart saw little
difference between the phone numbers dialed in that case, which the Court
refused to protect, and the phone conversation in Katz, which the Court did
protect. 43 Just like the numbers dialed, the "conversation itself must be
electronically transmitted by telephone company equipment, and may be
recorded or overheard by the use of other company equipment." 44 Justice
Stewart concluded that, although the information obtained from a pen register is
not as revealing as an actual conversation, it is "not without content" and "easily
could reveal the identities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal
the most intimate details of a person's life."45 Likewise, Justice Marshall sharply
criticized the Court's reliance on the purported voluntariness of the disclosure in
Smith.46 According to Justice Marshall, a person can only assume the risk of
conveying information to another party legitimately if the person has a choice
regarding whether to convey that information.47 Justice Marshall noted that no
real choice is involved in deciding whether to use a telephone, which is more
properly termed a necessity for most people in modem times. 48 He further
criticized the application of the third-party doctrine, stating that "[p]rivacy is not
a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose
certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need not
assume that this information will be released to other persons for other
purposes."4 Justice Marshall also reasoned that, under the Court's assumption
of risk analysis, all the police need to do to sidestep the Fourth Amendment is
publicly announce their intent to intercept random phone calls and letters,
thereby "put[ting] the public on notice of the risks they would thereafter assume
in such communications., 0 Justice Marshall argued for a more restrictive
interpretation of the third-party doctrine, writing that the determination of
whether a person has assumed the risk of a third party disclosing information to
the government should not be based "on the risks an individual can be presumed
to accept when imparting information to third parties, but on the risks he should
beforced to assume in a free and open society."5 1
In two cases that serve as an important analog for current location
information litigation, the Court made clear that individuals have no reasonable

42. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 746-48 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407
U.S. 297, 313 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967)).
44. Id. at 746.
45. Id. at 748 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. See id. at 749-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 749 ("Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice.").
48. See id. at 750 ("It is idle to speak of 'assuming' risks in contexts where, as a practical
matter, individuals have no realistic alternative.").
49. Id. at 749.
50. Id. at 750.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
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expectation of privacy in their movements on public roads. In United States v.
Knotts,53 the police obtained permission from a chemical company to place a
tracking beeper inside a container of chloroform; the chloroform was, in turn,
sold to someone suspected of manufacturing illegal drugs.54 The police used the
beeper to maintain visual surveillance of the vehicle transporting the container
and, eventually, to obtain a search warrant, which led to the discovery of drug55
making equipment.
The Court stated that "[a] person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his movements from one place to another." 56 According to the Court, it made no
difference that the police were aided in their observations of the vehicle's
movements by a tracking device.
Therefore, the Court found nothing
unconstitutional in the police officers' use of technology to augment what they
could already legally do.
United States v. Karo59 also involved government monitoring of a drug
suspect with a tracking beeper hidden in a container of chemicals. o In Karo,
however, the federal agents also used the beeper to reveal information from
inside the suspect's home.61 According to the Court, the agents crossed a
constitutional line when they used the beeper to determine something they could
not have visually observed from outside the suspect's house.62 The Court stated
that using the beeper to verify the container's location inside the suspect's home
was no different than physically entering the home and visually verifying the
container's location.63 Therefore, the Court established a distinction between
monitoring on open roads and monitoring the inside of a private residence. 64

52. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276
(1983).
53. 460 U.S. 276.
54. See id. at 278.
55. See id. at 278 79.
56. Id. at 281.
57. Id. at 282 ("The fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance,
but also on the use of the beeper to signal the presence of [the suspect's] automobile to the police
receiver, does not alter the situation.").
58. See id. ("Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology
afforded them in this case.").
59. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
60. Id. at 708.
61. See id. ("[A]gents determined by using the beeper that the ether was still inside the
house .... ).
62. See id. at 715.
63. See id. at 715, 716 ("Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from
public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely
some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight.").
64. See id. at 713-14. Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (finding
no constitutional violation when the police use technology to augment visual surveillance of
movements on public roads), with Karo, 468 U.S. at 714 (finding that police use of technology to
monitor the inside of a private residence does violate the Constitution).
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In Kyllo v. United States, 65 the Court considered a different kind of
technology used to glean information about the interior of a suspect's home.
Kyllo required the Court to determine the constitutionality of federal agents
using a thermal imaging device to measure the amount of heat coming from a
drug suspect's home.66 Agents used the device to gather evidence of the use of
heat lamps to grow marijuana plants indoors; this evidence was, in turn, used to
obtain a warrant to search the residence.67 The Court found it dispositive that the
imaging device revealed details about the interior of the suspect's home, which
is protected under the Fourth Amendment.68 Importantly, for purposes of
comparison to police tracking movements on public roads, the Court made clear
that it was irrelevant whether the information could also have been obtained by
some other means; rather, the constitutional violation itself is important. 69
The Court again took up the issue of police monitoring of an individual's
movements on public roads in United States v. Jones.70 Holding that the
government agents committed an unconstitutional search, the majority found
dispositive the fact that the agents placed a GPS tracking device on the suspect's
car without a warrant.
Although the Court held that the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test was not necessary to decide the case, the Court did
72
not repudiate that standard.
In his concurrence, Justice Alito relied on the
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis to find that the warrantless GPS
surveillance was unconstitutional.
Tellingly, Justice Alito noted the ability of
law enforcement to use cell phones as tracking devices.
He noted that the
widespread availability of these devices, combined with the ease with which law
enforcement can utilize them, supported reconsideration of privacy
expectations.
Justice Alito suggested a legislative solution, noting the lack of

65. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
66. See id. at 29.
67. See id. at 29-30.
68. See id. at 34 ("We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' . . . constitutes a search at least where (as here)
the technology in question is not in general public use." (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505, 512 (1961))).
69. See id. at 35 n.2 ("The fact that equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by
other means does not make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth Amendment.").
70. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
71. See id. at 949 ("It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information.").
72. See id. at 952 ("[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not
substitutedfor, the common-law trespassory test.").
73. See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[T]he use of longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy. For such offenses, society's
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not -and indeed, in the main,
simply could not-secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's car for
a very long period.").
74. Id. at 963.
75. Id. at 963-64.
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federal and state legislation to regulate the police use of this technology.76
Justice Sotomayor also wrote a separate concurrence, agreeing that the police
violated the Fourth Amendment by attaching the tracking device onto Jones's car
without a warrant. However, Justice Sotomayor also agreed with Justice Alito
that long-term, warrantless monitoring could, by itself, violate the Fourth
Amendment.
Justice Sotomayor suggested reconsidering the third-party
doctrine, stating that it "is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of
carrying out mundane tasks."79 Although the Court did not need to consider the
third-party doctrine to decide Jones, Justice Sotomayor noted that such
disclosures would only be constitutionally protected "if our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy."80
B. Lower Courts
To date, the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case regarding the police use of
CSLI. Lower courts have grappled with this and related issues, however, and
have reached different conclusions.81 For instance, the Fourth Circuit held that
subscriber information-including an individual's name and address-conveyed
to phone companies and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) is not protected by the
Fourth Amendment because any expectation of privacy a person may have in
such information is unreasonable.82 The Fourth Circuit, however, has not yet
heard a case dealing with the police use of CSLI.
In contrast, the Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have explicitly ruled on
challenges to the police use of CSLI in criminal investigations.8 3 While these
circuits have reached different conclusions with respect to the standard the

76. Id. at 964.
77. See id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 950 n.3 (majority opinion))
("The Government usurped Jones'[s] property for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him,
thereby invading privacy interests long afforded, and undoubtedly entitled to, Fourth Amendment
protection.").
78. See id. at 955 (quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring)).
79. Id. at 957.
80. Id.
81. Compare In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615
(5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the lesser standard of "specific and articulable facts" for CSLI data in
the Stored Communications Act is not unconstitutional, even though it does not rise to the level of a
Fourth Amendment "probable cause" standard), and United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 775
(6th Cir. 2012) (holding that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI), with
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov't, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that judges have discretion to
require a warrant showing probable cause before issuing orders to disclose CSLI).
82. United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010).
83. See In re Application for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 605-06 (citing Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)); Skinner, 690 F.3d at 775-76; In re Application for an
OrderDirectingProviderofElec. Commc'n Serv., 620 F.3d at 305-06.
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government must meet in applications for orders to produce CSLI,8 4 this
discrepancy is largely the result of differing statutory, rather than constitutional,
interpretations.
Furthermore, even the CSLI case from the Third Circuitwhich ostensibly provides more protection for individual privacy will, in most
cases, not require the government to obtain a warrant based on probable cause. 86
In the In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a
Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the
Government case, the Third Circuit compared CSLI to the tracking devices at
issue in Karo and Knotts.8 Based on this comparison, as well as the fact that no
evidence showed that the CSLI revealed any information about a user's location
inside the home, the court held that an order to obtain CSLI did not require
probable cause per se. Instead, the court's decision turned on the language of
the statute the government used to request the court order: the Stored
Communications Act (SCA). 89 The court noted two methods by which the
government may seek a disclosure of CSLI: through a warrant or an order under
the SCA. 90 Because obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause is one of
those methods, the court held that a judge could require a warrant showing
probable cause instead of issuing an order under the SCA. 91 Nonetheless,
despite recognizing that "[a] cell phone customer has not 'voluntarily' shared his
location information with a cellular provider in any meaningful way," 92 the court
concluded that requiring a warrant supported by probable cause "is an option to
be used sparingly." 93

84. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
86. See In re Applicationfor an OrderDirectingProviderofElec. Commc'n Serv., 620 F.3d
at 319 (stating that requiring a warrant to obtain CSLI "is an option to be used sparingly" given the
statutory availability of a court order).
87. Id. at 312 (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-715 (1984)) (citing United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
88. Id. at 312-13.
89. See id. at 305-06 ("This appeal gives us our first opportunity to review whether a court
can deny a Government application under [the SCA] after the Government has satisfied its burden
of proof under that provision .... ). The SCA provides the means by which the government can
acquire information from electronic communication providers. See id. at 306. In addition to listing
the information that can be obtained, the SCA also details the methods that may be used to obtain
that information. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(d) (2012). Electronic communication service providers
can be ordered to turn over customer records by a warrant or a court order issued pursuant to the
SCA. See id. § 2703(c)(1)(A)-(B).
A court order may be issued pursuant to the SCA "if the
governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." Id. § 2703(d).
90. See In re Application for an Order DirectingProvider of Elec.Commc'n Serv., 620 F.3d
at 319.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 317.
93. Id. at 319.
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The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, held that cell phone users do voluntarily turn
over their location information to service providers when using their cell
phones. 94 The court described a person's decision to obtain and use a cell phone
as a voluntary act leading to the voluntary disclosure of location information
every time the person uses the phone. 95 Based on this reasoning, the court held
that the business records doctrine, as spelled out in Smith and Miller, applied to
CSLI.96 Because the Fourth Amendment was therefore inapplicable, the court
held that requiring probable cause and refusing an order that met the lesser
"reasonable grounds" and "specific and articulable facts" standard outlined in the
SCA was not within the judge's discretion.97
The Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, is unique in its view that CSLI is not
entitled to constitutional protection under the Fourth Amendment because
acquiring it does not constitute a search. 98 In United States v. Skinner, the court
determined there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI produced by a
"voluntarily procured ... cell phone."99
The court compared the location
information a cell phone gives off to the scent a bloodhound might track,
concluding that requiring a warrant to follow the former, when one obviously is
not necessary to trace the latter, would mean that "technology would help
criminals but not the police." oo The court saw "no inherent constitutional
difference between trailing a defendant and tracking him via such technology [as
CSLI and GPS]."10 1

94. In re Application of the U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612 (5th Cir.
2013) ("[U]sers know that they convey information about their location to their service providers
when they make a call and . .. they voluntarily continue to make such calls.").
95. Id. at 613-14.
96. See id. at 615 ("Cell site data are business records and should be analyzed under that line
of Supreme Court precedent."); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (stating that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers voluntarily conveyed to the phone
company in the ordinary course of its business); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976)
(concluding that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in financial documents
voluntarily given to a bank for use in the ordinary course of the bank's operations).
97. In re Application for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 615; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d) (2012).
98. See United States v. Barajas, 710 F.3d 1102, 1108 n.2 (10th Cir. 2013).
99. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012); see also id. at 781 ("Because
authorities tracked a known number that was voluntarily used while traveling on public
thoroughfares, Skinner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the GPS data and
location of his cell phone." (emphasis added)). The Sixth Circuit distinguished this case from Jones
by noting that the Supreme Court's holding in Jones was based on a physical trespass, an issue that
was absent in Skinner. See id. at 780 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012)).
100. Id. at 777.
101. Id. at 778. In Skinner, the police acquired both CSLI and real-time GPS information. See
id. at 776. Privacy advocates and defense lawyers have widely criticized Skinner. According to one
defense attorney, following Skinner could very well lead to the conclusion that the government
could track any vehicle, at any time, if it was already equipped with a GPS device. See Daniel K.
Gelb, United States v. Skinner: Using a Cell Phone Is Not a Consent to Search, THE CHAMPION,
Nov. 2012, at 30, 31.

Others have warned that the court's holding in Skinner "could easily

undergird a police state where all citizens are subject to electronic surveillance."
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While the Fourth Circuit has not heard a case dealing with CSLJ, a district
In United States v.
court within the circuit has addressed the issue.102
Graham,103 the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland noted that this
issue was one of first impression in the circuit. 104 In its survey of court opinions,
the court noted that most decisions do not implicate the Fourth Amendment's
probable cause requirement; instead, most courts rely on the business records
doctrine. o0 Therefore, the court refused to hold that police actions pursuant to
the SCA violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. 106
Regardless of the possibility of an appeal, the Fourth Circuit is unlikely to
provide much in the way of privacy protection for CSLI because the defendants,
in objecting to the government's use of their CSLI, did not argue that the SCA's
"reasonable grounds" and "specific and articulable facts" standard was
unconstitutional. 107 Instead, the defendants "ma[d]e an as-applied challenge"
based on "the length of time and extent of the cellular phone monitoring"
gathered by the police.108 Presumably, then, the most that the Fourth Circuit
could do on appeal is find that extensive CSLI covering a lengthy period of time
can only be obtained with a warrant supported by probable cause. 109 No
evidence indicates that the court would hold that such a warrant is always
required.11o Accordingly, individuals in the Fourth Circuit should not rely on
that court to provide greater privacy protections.
C. What It Means
Several common strands run through the decisions of the federal courts
regarding privacy protections for CSLI. These decisions show a reluctance to

Barry Horwitz & Gerald Jenkins, The Fourth Amendment Beyond Katz, Kyllo and Jones:
Reinstating Justifiable Reliance as a More Secure Constitutional Standardfor Privacy, 22 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 39 (2013).
102. See United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012).
103. 846 F. Supp. 2d 384.
104. Id. at 388.
105. See id. at 389.
106. Id. at 389-90. The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina noted the
Graham decision in the United States v. Eady case, stating that "[c]ourts in this Circuit have held
that defendants do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in historical cell site records."
United States v. Eady, No. 2:12-cr-00415-DCN 3, 2013 WL 4680527, *1 n.1 (D.S.C. Aug. 30,
2013).
107. See Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 387.
108. Id. ("Essentially, the Defendants present[ed] the question of whether twenty-four hour
'dragnet' surveillance by emerging technological means infringes on the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.").
109. See generally United States v. Hager, 721 F.3d 167, 182 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that
when constitutional challenges to a statute are not raised at the district court level, the decision is
subject only to plain error review).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information voluntarily given to
phone and Internet companies).
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protect information conveyed to a third party, regardless of whether the
information is consciously communicated to that third party.1
The courts'
reluctance is especially troubling in the context of modem technology. For
instance, because CSLI is automatically generated whenever a cell phone is
turned on, a cell phone user usually does not voluntarily convey this information
to anyone-at least not in any meaningful sense of the word.1 12
The courts have also compared CSLI to financial records given to a bank
and numbers dialed from a particular phone that are communicated to a phone
company.1 13 These analogies are faulty, however, because CSLI is generated by
a user's cell phone and communicated without any action from the user.
Police collection of CSLI stands in contrast to a list of numbers dialed from a
certain phone, which, by definition, only contains numbers that a user has
communicated to the phone company when that user chooses to call a particular
person or business. Location information, on the other hand, is constantly
generated every few seconds without any input from the phone's user.
The comparison to a list of phone numbers and financial records is lacking
for another reason as well. While phone numbers can be revealing, CSLI
threatens to be much more so. As Justice Sotomayor noted, knowing where a
person travels can reveal an abundance of intimate details about that person.
Such information can reveal personal details that would otherwise be unavailable
without constant, around-the-clock visual surveillance. 116 In addition, as the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas recognized, CSLI does not
merely reveal information about movements on public streets: it has become
refined enough to reveal movements within buildings and even homes,11 which
have historically received the greatest protection from the government's
* * *118
inquinng eye.
Even though federal courts have been hesitant to recognize a reasonable
expectation of privacy in information conveyed to third parties, 119 some signs
indicate that this disinclination may be changing. The concurrences in Jones

111. See, e.g., supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (noting that, despite the lack of
voluntary conveyance of information, the information is still shared with a third party).
112. See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc'n
Serv. to Disclose Records, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010).
113. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
115. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("GPS
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects
a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.").
116. See id. at 956 (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)) (noting that new
technology allows the police to perform surveillance that would have previously been financially
untenable).
117. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)) (stating that protection of the home from government interference
forms the core of the Fourth Amendment).
119. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
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revealed that a majority of the Supreme Court is willing to recognize that longterm, widespread monitoring of a erson's movements violates that person's
reasonable expectations of privacy.
While the monitoring in Jones involved a
GPS device attached to an individual's car,121 the same standard can logically
apply to CSLI gathered from an individual's cellular service provider. As
Justice Sotomayor hinted, it borders on the absurd to continue basing privacy
jurisprudence on the notion that individuals lose a reasonable expectation of
privacy in information they do not keep completely secret.122 The concurrences
of Justices Sotomayor and Alito in Jones demonstrate a positive step toward
federal courts reevaluating privacy norms and, perhaps, the federal judiciary's
recognition of changing privacy expectations in the twenty-first century.123
Hopefully, these concurrences presage a growing awareness by the federal
judiciary that when people decide to purchase and use cell phones, they do not
also decide to allow the government to track their every movement. 124
Privacy advocates also have reason to be excited about Klayman v.
Obama,125 a recent district court decision regarding the related issue of the
NSA's mass collection of Americans' telephone metadata. Although the
government defended the program by referring to the holding in Smith that
people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial
because the numbers are communicated to the phone company, a third party
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia disagreed.126 The court
concluded "that [the] plaintiffs have a very significant expectation of privacy in
an aggregated collection of their telephony metadata,"1 27 criticizing the
indiscriminate collection of Americans' data as "almost-Orwellian."l28 The
court questioned the continued validity of using Smith to decide issues such as
the one before it, noting that "the relevance of [Smith] has been eclipsed by
technological advances and a cell phone-centric lifestyle heretofore
inconceivable." 1 29

120. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
121. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
122. See id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
123. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
124. See generally Gelb, supra note 101, at 31 ("Cell phones ... are not purchased with the
expectation that the government will have unfettered access in order to mine through the geolocation data created through use of the phone.").
125. 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
126. See id. at 30-31 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-44 (1979)).
127. Id. at 39.
128. Id. at 33. But see ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding
the NSA's collection of metadata constitutional). In ACLU v. Clapper, the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York pointed to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, to support its
conclusion that the massive data collection program is an essential tool in counteracting terrorists'
use of technology to plan and carry out attacks. See id. at 757.
129. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 43; see also id. at 37 ("[T]he Smith pen register and the
ongoing NSA Bulk Telephony Metadata Program have so many significant distinctions between
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While these and other federal decisions indicate growing unease with using
twentieth century cases to resolve twenty-first century problems,130 they also
indicate that change is often slow. While some courts-even the Supreme
Court have indicated a willingness to readdress privacy precedent, federal
decisions are still dominated by a belief that any information conveyed to
another is undeserving of privacy protections.131 Unless the Supreme Court
revisits its holding in Smith, the federal judiciary seems unlikely to provide
privacy protection to Americans' CSLJ.132 As one scholar noted, for the time
being, "as a matter of federal law we are solely dependent upon statutory
protection for all third party information."1 33

them that I cannot possibly navigate these uncharted Fourth Amendment waters using as my North
Star a case that predates the rise of cell phones.").
130. See generally Stephen E. Henderson, Learningfrom all Fifty States: How to Apply the
Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable
Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 386-87 (2006) (citing United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942 (6th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, vacated on other grounds sub nom. Garner v. United States, 543 U.S.
1100 (2005); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecomms. Records &
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register & Trap & Trace, 405 F. Supp. 2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005))
(noting that there were four decisions by federal magistrates in 2005 that demonstrated reluctance in
applying the third-party doctrine to CSLI); see also In re Application of the U.S. for an Order
Authorizing the Installation & Use of a Pen Register & a Caller Identification Sys. on Tele. Nos.,
402 F. Supp. 2d 597 (D. Md. 2005); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the
Use of a Pen Register & a Trap & Trace Device & (2) Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. &/or
Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Application for Pen Register &
Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
131. See, e.g., Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 749 ("[A]n individual has no legitimate expectation
of privacy in information provided to third parties"); see also Shaun B. Spencer, The Surveillance
Society and the Third-PartyPrivacy Problem, 65 S.C. L. REV. 374, 383-84 (2013) (noting that "one
cannot expect privacy in information shared with third parties"). At least one scholar has argued
that the third-party doctrine should be limited to information revealed to a third party for use by that
third party. See Henderson, supra note 130, at 378 (citing Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New
Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational Doctrine ofFourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L.
REV. 507, 524-28 (2005) [hereinafter Nothing New Under the Sun?]). For instance, a phone
company does not need to know a cell phone user's location to complete a call, so that information
should be protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy. Cf Nothing New Under the Sun?,
supra, at 526 (noting that, even though the contents of a telephone conversation are transmitted via
the phone company's network, users retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in those contents
because the phone company need not know them to complete the call). For an argument that a
"justifiable reliance" standard would provide greater privacy protections than the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard, see Sobel et al., supra note 101, at 23-28 (citations omitted).
132. See, e.g., Sobel et al., supra note 101, at 44 ("Whatever the legislative protections, the
Supreme Court needs to articulate a clear restatement that electronic intrusions and the use of senseenhancing tools constitute searches and require warrants supported by probable cause.").
133. Henderson, supra note 130, at 413.
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III. STATE ACTION

A.

LegislativeAction: Montana and Maine

Despite the equivocation at the federal level, some states have taken
definitive steps to provide greater privacy protections for cell phone users.134
For example, Montana and Maine recently enacted laws requiring that police
obtain warrants before acquiring CSLI.135 In addition, the New Jersey Supreme
Court recently held that police in that state also must obtain warrants before
acquiring CSLJ, noting that the state constitution provides greater protections
than those found in the Fourth Amendment. 136 These states' actions are a step in
the right direction and demarcate a clear path forward that South Carolina can,
and should, follow.
Montana was the first state to pass a law requiring that police get a warrant
supported by probable cause to obtain CSLI.137 The Montana statute includes a
blanket prohibition against the government acquiring location information from
an electronic device without first obtaining a warrant.138 The statute defines an
electronic device, in part, as "a device that enables access to or use of an
electronic communication service,"l39 and location information as "information
concerning the location of an electronic device that, in whole or in part, is
generated or derived from or obtained by the operation of an electronic
device." 1 40 The definitions of electronic device and location information clearly

134. Cf SC House Passes Bill Limiting Use of Public Unmanned Drones, S.C. RADIO
NETWORK (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.southcarolinaradionetwork.com/2014/01/16/sc-housepasses-bill-limiting-use-of-public-unmanned-drones/ (reporting that the South Carolina House of
Representatives passed a bill requiring police to obtain a warrant before using unmanned
surveillance drones). One cosponsor of the bill restricting the use of drones in South Carolina
expressed concerns about drones violating constitutional rights, including the right to privacy and
the freedom from unreasonable searches. See John Monk, Bill Would Regulate S.C. Police Spy
Drones, THE STATE, May 15, 2013, at Al, available at http://www.thestate.com/2013/05/14/
2771486/house-bill-would- scrutinize- scpolice.html.
135. See Ryan Gallagher, Maine Enacts PioneeringLaw Prohibiting Warrantless Cellphone
Tracking, SLATE (July 10, 2013, 3:34 P.M.), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future tense/2013/07/10/
new mainelaw-prohibits warantlesscellphone tracking.html.
Lawmakers proposed similar
legislation in Texas, but it failed to pass. See id. Also, while California legislators passed a bill
requiring warrants in 2012, the governor vetoed it. See Kate Zernike, Court Restricts Police
Searches of Phone Data, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2013, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/07/19/nyregion/new-jersey-supreme-court-restricts-police-searches-of-phone-data.html?_r=0.
136. See Zernike, supra note 135; see also infra Part III.B.
137. See Allie Bohm, Firstin the Nation: Montana Requires a Warrantfor Location Tracking,
ACLU (June 20, 2013, 10:15 A.M.), https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-nationalsecurity/first-nation-montana-requires-warrant-location; Gallagher, supra note 135.
138. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-1 10(1)(a) (2013). It is worth noting that the Montana
constitution explicitly protects the right to privacy. See MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 10.
139. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-110(2)(b).
140. Id. § 46-5-110(2)(d).
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encompass the CSLI automatically generated by cell phones. 141 The statute then
lists exceptions to this general rule that allow police to obtain such information
without a warrant in certain circumstances.142 Under the statute, police do not
need a warrant to obtain location information from an electronic device if the
owner of the device reports it stolen,143 if the police are responding to a call by
the user of the device requesting emergency services, 144 if the police have the
informed consent of the owner or user of the device,145 or if a possible lifethreatening situation exists. 146 The exception for life-threatening situations
anticipates a possible objection from law enforcement, as some have justified the
police use of location information by pointing to the number of lives saved as a
result of its use.147 This exception is also consistent with existing Supreme Court
precedent regarding exceptions to the warrant requirement for exigent
circumstances.148 Violations of the statute result in the exclusion of evidence so
obtained, along with a civil fine. 149
In Maine, a bill requiring that police obtain a warrant before acquiring CSLI
overcame opposition from law enforcement, as well as a governor's veto, to
become law.
Similar to the Montana statute, the Maine law generally requires
a warrant before the government can obtain location information from an
individual's cell phone.15 1 Maine's statute defines an electronic device, in part,
as "a device that enables access to, or use of, an electronic communication
service"152 and location information as "information concerning the location of

141. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
142. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-1 10(1)(b).
143. Id. § 46-5-1 10(1)(b)(i).
144. Id. § 46-5-1 10(1)(b)(ii).
145. Id. § 46-5-1 10(1)(b)(iii).
146. Id. § 46-5-1 10(1)(b)(iv).
147. See Lichtblau, supra note 9, at A20 (reporting that one police department used location
information to find a stabbing victim). According to one criminal analyst, the use of CSLI is
valuable because "[w]e find people .. .and it saves lives." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. See, e.g., Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) ("One exigency
obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or
threatened with such injury.").
149. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-110(1)(c)-(d).
Given that the fine is capped at fifty
dollars, enforcement of the statute will most likely depend on the exclusion provision. See id. § 465-110(1)(d).
150. See Christopher Cousins, Maine House Backs Bill to Require Warrant for Cellphone
Tracking, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (May 29, 2013, 8:38 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2013/05/
29/politics/state-house/maine-house-backs-bill-to-require-warrant-for-cellphonetracking/?ref=latest
(noting opposition to the bill from law enforcement); Gallagher, supra note 135 (noting that the
Maine legislature overrode the governor's veto of the bill). Maine also passed legislation protecting
the contents of electronic communications. See An Act to Protect Cellular Telephone Privacy, ch.
402, 2013 Me. Laws 993 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 641-46 (Supp. 2013)).
151. Compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-1 10(1)(a) (2013) ("[A] government entity may not
obtain the location information of an electronic device without a search warrant. . . ."), with ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 648 (Supp. 2013) ("[A] government entity may not obtain location
information without a valid warrant ....

152. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
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an electronic device, including both the current location and any prior location of
the device, that, in whole or in part, is generated, derived from or obtained by the
operation of an electronic device."l53 The definitions of electronic device and
location information closely mirror those found in the Montana lawl54 and
clearly encompass cell phones and the location information they automatically
generate.
Much like the law in Montana,156 however, the Maine law provides
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 15 Specifically, the Maine law allows the
police to obtain CSLI without a warrant in response to a request for emergency
services,15 with the consent of the owner or user of an electronic device, 159 with
the consent of the guardian or next of kin of an owner or user of a device
believed to be dead or reported missing,160 or when "an emergency involving
immediate danger of death or serious physical injury" exists and "a warrant
cannot be obtained in time to prevent the identified danger."1 61 The law also
requires the government with some exceptions-to give notice to an individual
that the government has acquired location information about that individual from
an electronic device.162 Within three days of obtaining the location information,
the government must inform the individual about the nature of its inquiry; what
location information was acquired; and, if the information was acquired from a
third party, from whom it was acquired.163 This provision is important because
an individual would otherwise not likely know that the government has obtained
personal CSLI: gathering of such information by the police is "typically done
without . . . public awareness."l64 In fact, "[m]any departments try to keep cell
tracking secret" to avoid a "possible backlash from the public."1 65
B. JudicialAction: New Jersey
New Jersey also recently made headlines by extending
CSLI.166 The development in New Jersey, however,
legislature, but from the state supreme court.
In State v.
Court of New Jersey held that individuals have a protected

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

privacy protections to
came not from the
Earls,168 the Supreme
privacy interest in the

Id. § 647(5).
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-110(2)(b), (d) (2013).
See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-110(1)(b).
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 650.
Id. § 650(1).
Id. § 650(2).
Id. § 650(3).
Id. § 650(4).
See id. § 649.
See id. § 649(1).
Zernike, supra note 135.
Lichtblau, supra note 9, at A20.
See Zernike, supra note 135.
See id.
70 A.3d 630 (N.J. 2013).
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location information created by their cell phones.169 The court's holding was
based on its interpretation of the New Jersey constitution.17 0 The language in
New Jersey's analog to the Fourth Amendment is essentially identical to that
found in the Federal Constitution. 1 Notwithstanding the similarity of the
language, the court noted that "the protections [granted by the Fourth
Amendment and the state constitution] against unreasonable searches and
seizures are not always coterminous."l72 Therefore, although a warrant may not
be required to obtain location information from a cell phone as a matter of
federal constitutional law, the New Jersey Supreme Court was not foreclosed
from deciding that a warrant is required as a matter of state constitutional law.173
The holding in Earls was supported, in large part, by previous decisions of
the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreting the state constitution's role in
resolving privacy issues.174
In addition to cases interpreting the state
constitution, the court also addressed the third-party doctrine as well as the
nature of CSLI, considering how these issues relate to reasonable expectations of
*175
privacy.
Importantly, the court noted that the third-party doctrine had been effectively
rejected in New Jersey.17 6 For example, in State v. Reid,1 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey determined that a person has a legitimate privacy interest in
subscriber information provided to ISPs.1 8
In so concluding, the court
acknowledged that it was diverging from "settled federal law that a person has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information exposed to third parties."l79
Additionally, in State v. McAllister,so the court held that "under the New Jersey
Constitution, citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank

169. Id. at 644 ("[T]he New Jersey Constitution protects an individual's privacy interest in the
location of his or her cell phone.").
170. Id. ("Our ruling today is based solely on the State Constitution.").
171. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 7.
172. Earls, 70 A.3d at 641 (quoting State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 955 (N.J. 1982)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
173. See id. (noting that, despite the similarities between the two constitutions, Fourth
Amendment rights offered under the New Jersey constitution often provide greater protection than
the U.S. Constitution); see also id. at 644 ("We recognize that [United States v.] Jones and Smith [v.
Maryland], to the extent they apply, would not require a warrant in this case.").
174. See id. at 641 ("On a number of occasions, this Court has found that the State
Constitution provides greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth
Amendment.").
175. See id. at 641-44 (citations omitted).
176. See id. at 641 ("[A]n individual's privacy interest under New Jersey law does not turn on
whether he or she is required to disclose information to third-party providers to obtain service.").
177. 945 A.2d 26 (N.J. 2008).
178. Id. at 28. But see United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding
that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information voluntarily
given to phone and Internet companies).
179. Reid, 945 A.2d at 31.
180. 875 A.2d 866 (N.J. 2005).
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records."181 Finally, in a decision finding an expectation of privacy in phone
records, the court observed that "[i]t is unrealistic to say that the cloak of privacy
has been shed because the telephone company and some of its employees are
aware of this information."l82
The Supreme Court of New Jersey still relies on reasonable expectations of
privacy in determining whether government action constitutes an unreasonable
search or seizure. 183 However, because the state supreme court has sometimes
disagreed with the U.S. Supreme Court as to what constitutes a reasonable
expectation of privacy, 184 and because the state constitution provides greater
protections than the Fourth Amendment,1 s5 the analysis can be very different.
As noted above, the fact that one has disclosed something to a third party does
not, by itself, destroy that person's reasonable expectations of privacy under
New Jersey law. 186 For instance, in Reid, when the court held that subscriber
information provided to ISPs is protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy,
the court relied on people's common sense expectations when using the
Internet. 18
In concluding that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
CSLI, the Supreme Court of New Jersey noted the extent of the information that
such data can reveal.
The court determined that CSLI can be even more
revealing than a person's phone records or Internet history turning a cell phone
into "a tracking device" that acts "as a substitute for 24/7 surveillance" and
"involves a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not anticipate."1 89
Importantly, the court also noted that, because CSLI is continuously created, it
includes records of a person in both public and private places. 190 Therefore,
CSLI "does more than simply augment visual surveillance in public areas."l91
Considered in that light, the police use of CSLI is more akin to the type of
monitoring deemed unconstitutional in Karol92 than that upheld in Knotts. 193
Finally, in highlighting the role that cell phones play in modem society, the court

181. Id. at 867. But see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (concluding that a
person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in financial documents voluntarily given to a bank).
182. State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 956 (N.J. 1982). But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
744 (1979) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily given to phone
companies).
183. See State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 632 (N.J. 2013).
184. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 28, 31 (N.J. 2008) (discussing the court's rejection
of the federal third-party doctrine for information provided to ISPs).
185. See Earls, 70 A.3d at 641.
186. See id.
187. See Reid, 945 A.2d at 33 ("[W]hen users surf the Web from the privacy of their homes,
they have reason to expect that their actions are confidential.").
188. See Earls, 70 A.3d at 642.
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 643.
192. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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stated that the ubiquity of cell phones, combined with the reasons for which they
are used, leads to the conclusion that people have a justifiable expectation of
privacy in the location information they generate by using their cell phones. 194
C.

What It Means

While many federal courts remain in strict allegiance to the third-party
doctrine, some states have acted in accordance with the Court's statement in
Katz that privacy is an area largely governed by state law.195 Although even
after Jones federal courts continue to compare modem technological
developments such as CSLI to items as mundane as a smell that a dog can
trace, the above discussion shows that some states have boldly progressed into
the twenty-first century. Furthermore, some states have even rejected the thirdparty doctrine entirely, thus removing a major barrier in the way of protecting
CSLI. 197
Any attempt to catalog every state's substantive privacy standards would, of
course, be a lengthy process and one beyond the scope of this Note.198 Such a
survey would necessarily be complex and incomplete.199 What is important is
that states can, and have, provided privacy protections beyond those found in the
Fourth Amendment. Further, from a practical perspective, a state decision
requiring the police to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before
obtaining CSLI does not amount to a decision condemning the state to rampant
criminality.200 Finally, notwithstanding the effectiveness of legislative action to

194. See Earls, 70 A.3d at 643. The court noted that people do not buy cell phones so that the
police can track their every movement and, even though many people may know that their phones
can be tracked, most people do not know the extent to which they can be tracked and they
certainly do not expect the police to do so. Id.
195. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012) (comparing use of a
pay-as-you-go cell phone to the use of fugitive tracking dogs because "[t]he law cannot be that a
criminal is entitled to rely on the expected untrackability of his tools").
197. See Henderson, supra note 130, at 413 (noting that eleven states reject the third-party
doctrine and signs show that ten others may also reject it); see also id. at 425 ("It is encouraging that
many states have parted course with the United States Supreme Court with respect to the third-party
doctrine, and that others seem inclined to follow.").
198. See generally id. at 395-412 & nn. 117-68 (citations omitted) (examining all fifty states
and determining whether they follow the federal third-party doctrine).
199. See id. at 394 (admitting the "uncertainty" and "ambiguity" inherent in such an analysis).
For an insightful opinion by a state supreme court justice recognizing the third party doctrine but
expressing discomfort at how far it could be extended, see State v. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, 116 P.3d
800, 806-07 (Mont. 2005) (Nelson, J., concurring). Justice Nelson observed, "I don't like living in
Orwell's 1984; but I do." Id. at 807.
200. See supra notes 143-48, 158-61 and accompanying text (listing exceptions to the warrant
requirement in certain situations). Cf Cell Phone Location Tracking Public Records Request, supra
note 10 ("If [some] police departments can protect both public safety and privacy by [voluntarily]
meeting the warrant and probable cause requirements, then surely other agencies can as well."). As
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protect privacy, it is worth noting that given the ever-changing nature of modem
technology and the amount of disclosure the use of such technolot entails, a
judicial decision extending privacy protection to CSLI is preferable.
IV. A WAY FORWARD FOR SOUTH CAROLINA
South Carolina's constitution, statutes, and case law clearly support the
proposition that South Carolina courts should provide individuals greater privacy
protections than those provided by federal courts. This, in turn, supports the
conclusion that the Supreme Court of South Carolina should like the Supreme
Court of New Jersey extend constitutional protection to CSLI.
In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, the South Carolina constitution
explicitly states that the people shall be protected against "unreasonable
invasions of privacy."202 In addition, state law requires a warrant supported by
probable cause before authorities can install and use an electronic tracking
203
device.
And perhaps most importantly, the South Carolina Supreme Court has
explicitly recognized that the state constitution provides greater privacy
protections than the U.S. Constitution.204

of the writing of this Note, the Author is aware of no reports that Montana, Maine, or New Jersey
have descended into anarchy.
201. See Henderson, supra note 130, at 425 ("In a world in which we give so much
information to third parties, piecemeal statutory protection is insufficient."); see also id. at 386
(observing that legislative protections can be removed as easily as they can be created).
202. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10. Compare id. ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable
invasions of privacy shall not be violated .... ) (emphasis added), with U.S. CONST. amend. IV
("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ). Montana, another state with an
explicit privacy provision in its constitution, recently enacted legislation requiring warrants for the
police acquisition of CSLI. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
203. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-30-140 (2014). The statute not only makes clear that courts
can require greater specificity than that required by the statute, but also that its provisions are
subject to the standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the installation and use of
tracking devices. Id. § 17-30-140(D)-(E). The statute defines a tracking device as "an electronic or
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object." Id. § 17-30140(F). Relying heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Jones, one South Carolina court held
that the police committed an unreasonable search in violation of the suspect's constitutional rights
when they placed a GPS tracking device on the suspect's vehicle without first obtaining a warrant.
See State v. Adams, 397 S.C. 481, 487-89, 725 S.E.2d 523, 527 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993)).
Given the tracking capabilities of cell phones, applying the same standard to CSLI as to external
tracking devices would not be a great leap.
204. See State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 541 S.E.2d 837 (2001); see also Christopher R.
Jones, Note, "eyePhones": A Fourth Amendment Inquiry into Mobile Iris Scanning, 63 S.C. L.
REv. 925, 942 (2012) (stating that the South Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted article I,
section 10 of the state constitution to offer a higher level of privacy protection than that offered by
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
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The South Carolina Supreme Court fully recognized the greater protections
afforded by the state constitution in State v. Forrester.20 The court observed
that the Federal Constitution establishes the minimum for individual rights,
whereas the state constitution establishes the outer limits of those rights. 206
Accordingly, state courts can interpret state constitutional provisions so as to
provide greater protection than analogous federal provisions.207 The South
Carolina Supreme Court further stated that "by articulating a specific prohibition
against 'unreasonable invasions of privacy,' the people of South Carolina have
indicated that searches and seizures that do not offend the [F]ederal Constitution
may still offend the South Carolina Constitution."208 Therefore, the state
constitution "favors an interpretation offering a higher level of privacy protection
than the Fourth Amendment." 209
Most importantly, for the purposes of this Note, the South Carolina Supreme
Court noted that "the drafters of our state constitution's right to privacy
provision were principally concerned with the emergence of new electronic
technologies that increased the government's ability to conduct searches." 210
The drafters intended to create a provision that would provide protections
separate from, and in addition to, those provided by the Fourth Amendment in
case future Supreme Court jurisprudence proved less protective of individual
rights.211 It is telling that the comments made by the drafters of the South
Carolina constitution and relied upon by the South Carolina Supreme Court in
Forresterwere made in September and October of 1967 well before the U.S.
Supreme Court's opinions in Miller, Smith, and Knotts, which are so heavily
relied upon today by courts refusing to extend privacy protection to CSLI.2

205. See Forrester,343 S.C. at 644, 541 S.E.2d at 841.
206. See id. at 643, 541 S.E.2d at 840.
207. See id. at 644, 541 S.E.2d at 840 ("[The South Carolina Supreme] Court can interpret the
state protection against unreasonable searches and seizures in such a way as to provide greater
protection than the federal Constitution."); see also State v. Austin, 306 S.C. 9, 16, 409 S.E.2d 811,
815 (Ct. App. 1991) ("It is firmly established that state courts may interpret their own constitutions
in such a way as to expand rights conferred by the Federal Constitution. The principle of federalism
envisions two separate and independent judicial systems: federal courts, which construe federal law,
and state courts, which construe state law. State courts may, therefore, develop state law to provide
their citizens with a second layer of constitutional rights." (footnotes omitted) (citing William J.
Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489,
503 (1977))).
208. Forrester,343 S.C. at 644, 541 S.E.2d at 841.
209. Id. at 645, 541 S.E.2d at 841.
210. Id. at 647, 541 S.E.2d at 842. The South Carolina Supreme Court also quoted the drafters
as saying that the state constitution "should be revised to take care of the invasion of privacy
through modem electronic devices."
Id. (quoting COMMITTEE TO MAKE A STUDY OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1895, MINUTES OF COMMITTEE MEETING 6 (Sept. 15,

1967)).
211. See id. (quoting COMMITTEE TO MAKE A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1895, MINUTES OF COMMITTEE MEETING 7 (Oct. 6, 1967)).

212. See id.; see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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Although the comments are not binding,213 the foresight shown by the drafters of
the South Carolina constitution is compelling evidence that the protection against
unreasonable invasions of privacy in the state constitution should be extended to
include a prohibition against the warrantless tracking of individuals through a
device that has become as intimately intertwined with modem life as the cell
phone.
Lest this Note appear naively optimistic, it is worth noting that there are, of
course, significant differences between South Carolina jurisprudence and the
jurisprudence of New Jersey, which this Note argues South Carolina should
follow. For instance, unlike South Carolina, New Jersey has effectively rejected
the third-party doctrine.214 Professor Henderson also notes that, although the
South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the state constitution provides
greater privacy protections than the Fourth Amendment, it has-at least so far
interpreted the state constitutional provision in lockstep with the Fourth
Amendment.2 15
Professor Henderson also notes, however, that it is difficult to analyze state
analogs to the Fourth Amendment, particularly given the lack of relevant case
216
law.
Indeed, the only case Professor Henderson cites to demonstrate that
South Carolina does not recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in phone
numbers dialed is a more than two-decades-old decision dealing with a caller ID
service for landline telephones.217 The dearth of cases further lends support to
the notion that the South Carolina Supreme Court should find a reasonable
expectation of privacy in CSLI. Indeed, on the same day the South Carolina
Supreme Court issued its decision in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Company v. Hamm,21 the South Carolina Court of Appeals made clear that state
courts can interpret state constitutions to provide greater protections than the
Federal Constitution; the court of appeals even expressed surprise that the
defendant did not make an argument along those grounds.219 Furthermore, given
the vast technical differences between the caller ID system involved in Hamm
and present-day cell phone tracking technology, relying on Hamm to deny
privacy protection to CSLI would be the equivalent of relying on cassette tapes

213. See Forrester,343 S.C. at 647 n.7, 541 S.E.2d at 842 n.7.
214. Compare Henderson, supra note 130, at 399 n.125 (citing State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d
793, 801-02 (N.J. 1990); State v. Domicz, 873 A.2d 630, 642-44 (N.J. App. Div. 2005), rev'd, 907
A.2d 395, 412 (N.J. 2006)) (noting that New Jersey courts have recognized a reasonable expectation
of privacy in bank records, garbage, telephone numbers dialed, and utility records), with id. at 412
n. 165 (noting that the South Carolina Supreme Court has not recognized a reasonable expectation of
privacy in phone numbers dialed).
215. See id. at 412 n.165.
216. See id. at 394 & n.116.
217. See id. at 412 n.165.
218. See S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hamm, 306 S.C. 70, 409 S.E.2d 775 (decided Oct. 7,
1991).
219. See State v. Austin, 306 S.C. 9, 16-17, 409 S.E.2d 811, 815 (Ct. App. 1991) (decided
Oct. 7, 1991).
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for a personal music collection: the listener would be stuck in analog, while the
world has become digital.
V.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, South Carolina courts need not wait for the U.S. Supreme Court or
the Fourth Circuit to declare that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant
supported by probable cause for police to obtain CSLJ. The South Carolina
Supreme Court has made it clear that the state constitution can provide greater
protections for civil liberties than its federal counterpart.220 Likewise, should the
U.S. Supreme Court or the Fourth Circuit hold that police do not need to obtain a
warrant supported by probable cause to acquire CSLJ, South Carolina courts can,
and should, still do so. Such a requirement is the inexorable conclusion,
particularly given the state's constitution and the privacy protections it grants.221
W JacobHenerey

220. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 202, 204-12 and accompanying text. Of course, exceptions for exigent
circumstances, which already exist in constitutional jurisprudence and which have been codified by
statutes in Montana and Maine, should likewise apply to CSLI in South Carolina. No one can deny
the benefits of using CSLI in situations such as searching for escaped mental health patients. See
Jeffrey Collins, Escapee from SC Mental Hospital Captured in Tenn., ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 3,
2014,
available
at
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/escapee-sc-mental-hospital-captured-tenn
(describing how a man found not guilty by reason of insanity of murdering his parents escaped from
a mental health hospital in Columbia, South Carolina, and was found in Tennessee when the police
tracked his cell phone to a motel there).
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